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Abstract This paper explores a puzzling contrast: even can be used in denials
of presuppositions, but only when it appears below negation. I present a solution
to this puzzle that makes crucial use of the additive presupposition of even. This
presupposition is controversial; I argue that the evidence used to challenge its
presence does not show what it is claimed to show. I show that the puzzle is not
unique to English and sketch crosslinguistic implications of the proposed analysis.
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1 The puzzle
Even can be used in sentences that deny presuppositions, as in (1).
(1) A: When did Marisa stop smoking?  Marisa used to smoke
B: She didn’t even smoke!
Curiously, even can only be used in this way when it appears below negation.
(2) A: Did Kenji’s wife go to the party?  Kenji has a wife (i.e. is married)
B: He isn’t even married!
B′: # He’s even unmarried/a bachelor!
(3) A: I hear Maida was late for class again.  Maida has been late before
B: She’s never even been late before!
B′: # She’s even always been on time before!
(4) A: Who closed the window?  The window was open
B: It wasn’t even open!
B′: # It was even closed (already)!
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This restriction is puzzling for at least two reasons. Firstly, the positive (B′)
and negative (B) responses in (2-4) appear to be truth-conditionally equivalent, and
so it is unclear why even can only be used in the latter. Secondly, the unaccept-
ability of the positive responses does not appear to reflect general properties of
even or of presupposition denial. Positive presupposition denials without even, like
(5B′), are perfectly acceptable, as are positive sentences with even that do not deny
presuppositions, like (6).
(5) A: Did Kenji’s wife go to the party?
B: He isn’t married!
B′: He’s unmarried/a bachelor!
(6) Context: Alex keeps falling for married men. Tomo wants to help.
I think Derek would be great for Alex. He’s really sweet, and he’s even
unmarried!
Instead, it appears that the contrast in (2-4) reflects something about how even
interacts with presupposition denial. The goal of this paper is to find out what this
something is.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will establish
background assumptions about even. Section 3 will propose an explanation that
makes use of a controversial property of even. Section 4 will argue that the proposal
has desirable consequences for our semantics of even. Section 5 will discuss crosslin-
guistic predictions of the proposal. Section 6 will situate the current project with
respect to other work on even and presupposition denials. Section 7 will conclude.
2 Background
I will assume the scope theory of even (Karttunen & Peters 1979; Kay 1990; Wilkin-
son 1996; Lahiri 1998, i.a.).1 This theory holds that even is a focus-sensitive operator
that obligatorily takes scope above negation in negative sentences and has a lexical
entry as in (7).
(7) [[even]]g,w = λC<st,t>. λp<s,t>: ∀q ∈ C [q 6=p→ p <w q] &
∃q ∈ C [q 6= p & q(w) = 1]. p(w)
According to this denotation, even takes two arguments: the prejacent (p), which is
the proposition in the scope of even, and a contextually salient subset (C) of the focus
1 The analysis that I will propose can be translated straightforwardly into the ambiguity theory of even
(Rooth 1985; Rullmann 1997, i.a.); the two theories make equivalent predictions for the meanings of
simple sentences with and without negation.
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alternatives for p, which are structures derivable from p by making substitutions
of the appropriate type for the focused constituent (cf. Rooth 1985, 1992). Even
introduces two definedness conditions:2 a scalar presupposition that the prejacent is
less likely or more noteworthy than any of the other salient alternatives in C, and an
additive presupposition that there is at least one alternative in C besides the prejacent
that is true. When defined, even is truth-conditionally vacuous.
3 The proposal
I propose that the additive presupposition of even is responsible for the contrast
observed in Section 1; more particularly, this presupposition is only satisfiable in
presupposition denials under negation.
Our first task is to establish what is focused. The prosody of the sentences that
we are interested in is in principle compatible with either of the parses in (8). I will
assume that what is focused is the entire vP, including the trace of the subject, as in
(8b): a constituent of type <s,t>.
(8) He isn’t even MARRIED!
a. LF: evenC [NEG [he is [MARRIED]F]]
b. LF: evenC [NEG [he is MARRIED]F]
This means that the focus alternatives will be derived from the prejacent by making
substitutions for this proposition-sized constituent.
Next, we must establish which focus alternatives are salient. All of the even
sentences under consideration are used in response to something that another speaker
has said; Speaker A’s discourse move will make certain propositions salient, and
thus particularly attractive as substitutions. In (2), for example, Speaker A asks
a polar question, repeated in (9a), which denotes the set of propositions in (9b)
corresponding to its possible answers.
(9) a. Did Kenji’s wife go to the party?
b. {Kenji’s wife went to the party, Kenji’s wife didn’t go to the party}
These propositions all contain the presupposition trigger Kenji’s wife. When they
are substituted into the prejacent in place of the focused constituent, the resulting
alternatives will therefore contain the trigger for the presupposition that the prejacent
denies. This means that all of the non-prejacent alternatives will be undefined when
the prejacent is true, as shown in (10) and (11).
2 The quantificational force of the presuppositions and the precise flavour of the scale have been
subjects of debate in the literature on even. Nothing hinges on the particular choices made here.
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(10) He isn’t even married!
a. LF = evenC [NEG [he is married]F]
b. C = {NEG [he is married],
NEG [his wife went to the party],
NEG [his wife didn’t go to the party]}
= {He isn’t married,
#His wife didn’t go to the party,
#His wife went to the party}
(11) #He’s even unmarried!
a. LF = evenC [he is unmarried]F
b. C = {he is unmarried,
his wife went to the party,
his wife didn’t go to the party}
= {He is unmarried,
#His wife went to the party,
#His wife didn’t go to the party}
Because the additive presupposition of even requires that C contains at least one
non-prejacent alternative that is true, both (10) and (11) will suffer from an a failure
of this presupposition. This cannot be the whole story, because it fails to predict the
observed contrast between positive and negative presupposition denials with even.
We need a way of preventing the non-prejacent alternatives from being undefined
just in case they contain negation.
A tool with exactly this property can be found in trivalent logic:3 Bochvar’s
(1939) A operator. This operator has the truth table in (12); it takes a proposi-
tional argument and asserts that it is true. It maps true propositions to true, false
propositions to false, and presupposition failures to false, as if the presupposition
had been asserted; the A operator therefore has the effect of Heim’s (1983) local
accommodation.
(12) Truth table for A
p A(p)
T T
F F
# F
This means that, when inserted under negation, the A operator allows presuppositions
to be negated instead of projected.
3 The domain of truth values in trivalent systems contains not two but three members: 1, 0, and #.
Presupposition failures receive the third truth value.
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This operator provides a way of accounting for the acceptability of presupposition
denials like (13) in trivalent systems (Beaver 1995; Beaver & Krahmer 2001).
(13) The king of France isn’t bald; there is no king of France!
(14) a. NEG [the king of France is bald]
b. NEG [A [the king of France is bald]]
If the first clause in (13) is given the parse in (14a), the presupposition triggered by
the definite description the king of France will project across negation to become
a definedness condition for the entire clause; because the continuation denies this
presupposition, (13) should be incoherent, contrary to fact. Beaver & Krahmer
(2001) observe that, if the first clause is instead given the parse in (14b), the A
operator will turn the presuppositions of the definite description into part of the
assertive content of the proposition under negation. The entire first clause will
therefore presuppose nothing but instead assert that it is not true that there is a
(unique) king of France and that individual is bald; this is perfectly compatible with
the continuation, and so we correctly predict (13) to be acceptable.
With this additional ingredient in hand, all that is needed to derive our puzzling
contrast is to assume a parse of our presupposition denials with even that includes an
A operator.
In negative presupposition denials, assuming an LF with an A operator under
negation as in (15a) ensures that all of the alternatives contain this presupposition-
negating configuration, as in (15b).
(15) He isn’t even married!
a. LF = evenC [NEG [A [he is married]F]]
b. C = {NEG [A [he is married]],
NEG [A [his wife went to the party]],
NEG [A [his wife didn’t go to the party]]}
= {It’s not true that he is married,
True!It’s not true that he has a wife and she went to the party,
True!It’s not true that he has a wife and she didn’t go to the party}
In the non-prejacent alternatives, the A operator will prevent the unsatisfied presup-
position that Kenji has a wife from projecting across negation;4 instead, it maps his
wife went to the party and his wife didn’t go to the party to false – a truth value that
4 The presence of the A operator does not result in denial of the presupposition triggered by the definite
description the party. It has been independently argued (Romoli 2011) that A operators need to be
able to selectively accommodate some presuppositions in their scope while leaving others untouched;
one way of implementing this, suggested by Fox (2013), is to co-index the A operator with the
trigger(s) of the presupposition(s) it accommodates.
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negation will reverse. The resulting propositions (It’s not true that he has a wife
and she went to the party, It’s not true that he has a wife and she didn’t go to the
party) are compatible with the prejacent (It’s not true that he’s married); in fact,
they are entailed by it. This means that whenever the prejacent is true the additive
presupposition will be satisfied. The scalar presupposition of even is likewise triv-
ially satisfied; if the prejacent entails the non-prejacent alternatives, it cannot be
more likely than them. We therefore correctly predict that negative presupposition
denials with even will be felicitous.
In the positive presupposition denials, adding an A operator does not help. If
the LF of (2B′) is as in (16a), all of the alternatives will contain an A operator but
no higher negation (16b); the unsatisfied presupposition will therefore be asserted
instead of negated.
(16) # He’s even unmarried!
a. LF = evenC [A [he is unmarried]F]
b. C = {A [he is unmarried],
A [his wife went to the party],
A [his wife didn’t go to the party]}
= {It’s true that he is unmarried,
False!It’s true that he has a wife and she went to the party,
False!It’s true that he has a wife and she didn’t go to the party}
The resulting propositions are false whenever the prejacent is true; the additive
presupposition of even thus remains unsatisfied, and so we correctly predict that
positive presupposition denials with even will be infelicitous.
To sum up, we have successfully derived the puzzling contrast between positive
and negative presupposition denials with even from properties of even and properties
of presupposition denial. Even introduces an additive presupposition that is in
danger of being unsatisfied when the salient focus alternatives contain the trigger for
a presupposition that the prejacent denies. The A operator, a tool used to account for
presupposition denials in trivalent semantics, can save the alternatives from being
presupposition failures only under negation.
4 The additive presupposition
The proposal made above relies on the additive presupposition of even being un-
satisfied when the alternatives that it encounters are incompatible with each other.
However, it has been claimed that the additive presupposition of even is not ac-
tive when the alternatives are mutually exclusive (von Stechow 1991; Krifka 1992;
Rullmann 1997; Crnicˇ 2011). This claim is based on the alleged acceptability of
examples like (17) and (18).
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(17) A: Mary won a bronze medal.
B: No, she even won a SILVER medal. (Crnicˇ 2011: 152)
(18) Context: At yesterday’s party, people stayed with their first choice of drink.
Bill only drank WINE, Sue only drank BEER, and
John even1 only2 drank [WATER]F1, F2. (Krifka 1992: 22)
In (18), the exclusive contribution of only means that if John drank water he did not
drink anything else. In (17), world knowledge that one can win at most one medal
in a given event ensures that if Mary won a silver medal she did not win bronze or
gold. If these sentences are acceptable, the additive presupposition of even cannot
be active when the salient alternatives are mutually exclusive, and so it cannot be
responsible for the unacceptability of positive presupposition denials with even as
proposed in Section 3.
Upon closer examination, these data do not show what they are claimed to
show. I have been unable to replicate the judgement in (17); the native speakers of
English that I consulted judge this example to be infelicitous. The case of (18) is
more complicated. Native speakers do judge (18) to be acceptable, but only to the
extent that the alternatives are not taken to be mutually exclusive. As Wilkinson
(1996) observes, the context in (18) does not make salient a mutually exclusive set
of propositions of the form John only drank x; instead, it makes salient a set of
alternatives of the form y only drank x, which are perfectly compatible with each
other. This suggests a second focus, as in (19).
(19) Context: At yesterday’s party, people stayed with their first choice of drink.
Bill only drank WINE, Sue only drank BEER, and
[JOHN]F(1) even1 only2 drank [[WATER]F2]F1.
a. LF = evenC1 [onlyC2 [[John]F(1) drank [[water]F2]F1]]
b. C1 = {John only drank water, Sue only drank beer, Bill only drank wine...}
(adapted from Wilkinson 1996: 205)
This is corroborated prosodically; the subject cannot be deaccented, even if John has
been mentioned previously. When the context and prosody are controlled so that the
salient alternatives are mutually exclusive, as in (20), the result is infelicitous.
(20) Context: At the party last night, John stayed with his first choice of drink.
You’ll never guess what he chose.
# He even1 only2 drank [water]F1, F2.
a. LF = evenC1 [onlyC2 [he drank [water]F1,F2]]
b. C1 = {He only drank water, He only drank beer, He only drank wine...}
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Thus, it appears that – at least for the speakers whose judgements are reported in
this paper – even is unacceptable when the alternatives it encounters are mutually
exlusive but acceptable when the alternatives are not mutually exclusive. These data
are exactly what we should expect if the additive presupposition of even is active.
5 Crosslinguistic extensions
The puzzle observed in Section 1 is not just a quirk of English; it is reproduced for
even-like items in Russian (daže),5 Greek (kan), and German (überhaupt).
(21) Russian
A: Did Kenji’s wife go to the party?
B: ? Da
DA
on
he
daže
DAŽE
ne
NEG
ženat!
married
‘He isn’t even married!’
B′: # Da
DA
on
he
daže
DAŽE
xolostyak!
unmarried
(22) Greek
A: Did Kenji’s wife go to the party?
B: Ma
but
then
NEG
ine
is
kan
KAN
pandremenos!
married
‘But he isn’t even married!’
B′: * Ma
but
ine
is
kan
KAN
anipandros!
unmarried
(23) German
A: Did Kenji’s wife go to the party?
B: Er
he
ist
is
überhaupt
ÜBERHAUPT
nicht
NEG
verheiratet!
married
‘He isn’t even married!’
B′: # Er
he
ist
is
überhaupt
ÜBERHAUPT
unverheiratet!
unmarried
5 Native speakers of Russian report that voobšcˇe, an even-like item along the lines of überhaupt, can
be used instead of daže. However, judgements vary considerably between speakers. Some can use
this item on its own and report a contrast in the same direction as the other languages examined
here; others can use this item on its own and report no contrast. There are also speakers who require
that voobšcˇe be accompanied by the particle -to; when -to is present, both positive and negative
presupposition denials are acceptable.
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All of these items have an even-like semantics (Iatridou & Tatevosov 2016). Daže is
the garden-variety Russian even and behaves like its English counterpart. Greek has
several even items, of which kan is one; this item, often translated as so much as,
has the distribution of an NPI (Giannakidou 2007). Its unacceptability in positive
presupposition denials is thus unsurprising but fits with the crosslinguistic pattern
nonetheless. Überhaupt does not mean even; it is characterized by Anderssen
(2006) as a generalized domain widener. However, like even it picks out extreme
or noteworthy values on a scale, as shown in (24) and (25); this suggests a scalar
component.6
(24) Meine
my
Mutter
mother
kennt
knows
(überhaupt)
ÜBERHAUPT
jeden
everybody
in
in
Mindelheim.
Mindelheim
‘My mother knows (absolutely) everybody in Mindelheim.’
(Anderssen 2006: 62)
(25) Von
from
solchen
such
Leuten
people
kann
can
man
one
selten
rarely
(überhaupt)
ÜBERHAUPT
etwas
something
lernen.
learn
‘It’s rare that you can learn anything (at all) from such people.’
(Anderssen 2006: 60)
These items are also even-like in that they appear to have an additive component,
as demonstrated below. Daže and überhaupt, like English even, are unacceptable
in the medals scenario discussed in Section 4; this is shown in (26) and (27),
respectively. Greek kan is similarly unacceptable when its prejacent is the only true
alternative; in (28), where Alex is the only individual who Sam did not talk to, kan
cannot be used.
(26) A: Masha
Masha
vyigrala
won
bronzovuyu
bronze
medal’.
medal
‘Masha won a bronze medal.’
B: # Net!
No
Ona
she
daže
DAŽE
vyigrala
won
[serebryanuyu]F
silver
medal’!
medal
(27) A: Maria
Maria
hat
has
eine
a
Bronzemedaille
bronze-medal
gewonnen.
won
‘Maria won a bronze medal.’
B: # Nein!
No
Maria
Maria
hat
has
überhaupt
ÜBERHAUPT
eine
a
[Silbermedaille]F
silver-medal
gewonnen!
won
(28) Context: Sam talked to everyone at the party, with one notable exception.
# Den
NEG
mílise
talked
kan
KAN
me
to
ton
the
[Álex]F.
Alex
6 This can be thought of as even associating with subdomain alternatives (cf. Chierchia 2006).
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If the contrast between positive and negative presupposition denials with scalar
additive particles is due to their additive presupposition, we can make a testable
prediction: An item that is scalar like even but lacks an additive component will be
able to appear in both positive and negative presupposition denials. Hebrew bixlal
appears to be such an item. Bixlal has an even-like scalar component (Greenberg
& Khrizman 2012; Greenberg 2016).7 For example, on the scale of places that are
difficult to visit from Massachusetts that is made salient in (29),8 bixlal picks out
the most noteworthy (i.e. most distant) alternative, as shown in (29a) and (29c). It
cannot pick out the least noteworthy (i.e. least distant) alternative, as demonstrated
by the unacceptability of (29b) and (29d).
(29) Context: The Greens live in Boston, Massachusetts. They are complaining
that their three grown-up children all live too far away to visit easily.
a. Ann
Ann
gara
lives
be-Amherst,
in-Amherst
Dan
Dan
gar
lives
be-Ontario,
in-Ontario
ve
and
Jan
Jan
gar
lives
bixlal
BIXLAL
be-Israel!
in-Israel
‘Ann lives in Amherst, Dan lives in Ontario, and Jan even lives in Israel!’
b. # Jan
Jan
gar
lives
be-Israel,
in-Israel
Dan
Dan
gar
lives
be-Ontario,
in-Ontario
ve
and
Ann
Ann
gara
lives
bixlal
BIXLAL
be-Amherst!
in-Amherst
c. Ann
Ann
lo
NEG
gara
lives
be-Boston,
in-Boston,
Dan
Dan
lo
NEG
gar
lives
be-arcot
in-states
ha-brit,
the-united
ve
and
Jan
Jan
bixlal
BIXLAL
lo
NEG
gar
lives
ba-xeci
in-half
ha-ze
the-this
shel
of
ha-kadur!
the-globe
‘Ann doesn’t live in Boston, Dan doesn’t live in the United States, and
Jan doesn’t even live in this hemisphere!’
d. # Jan
Jan
lo
NEG
gar
lives
ba-xeci
in-half
ha-ze
the-this
shel
of
ha-kadur,
the-globe
Dan
Dan
lo
NEG
gar
lives
be-arcot
in-states
ha-brit,
the-united
ve
and
Ann
Ann
bixlal
BIXLAL
lo
NEG
gara
lives
be-Boston!
in-Boston
This item is compatible with mutually-exclusive alternatives, as shown in (30),
suggesting that it lacks an additive component.
7 In other environments, Greenberg & Khrizman (2012) and Greenberg (2016) report that bixlal has a
similar profile to überhaupt.
8 Special thanks to Itai Bassi and Danny Fox for their help in constructing this example. Amherst here
refers to Amherst, Massachusetts.
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(30) Context: B is a journalist doing a feature on bronze medallists. A is suggest-
ing people for B to interview.
A: Meri
Meri
zaxta
won
be-medaljat
in-medal
arad.
bronze
‘Meri won a bronze medal.’
B: Lo!
NEG
Hi
she
bixlal
BIXLAL
zaxta
won
be-medaljat
in-medal
[kesef]F.
silver
‘No! (What are you talking about?) She won a silver medal.’
(cf. Greenberg & Khrizman 2012: 141, Greenberg 2016: 501)
Bixlal can appear in both positive and negative presupposition denials, as predicted.
(31) A: Did Kenji’s wife go to the party?
B: Hu
he
bixlal
BIXLAL
lo
NEG
nasuj!
married
‘He isn’t even married!’
B′: Hu
he
bixlal
BIXLAL
ravak!
bachelor
‘(What are you talking about?) He’s a bachelor!’
Thus, the crosslinguistic predictions of our proposal appear to be supported.
6 Even and presupposition denial
Declaratives are not the only environment where a connection has been made between
even and presupposition denial. Iatridou & Tatevosov (2016) describe a use of even
in questions9 that bears a family resemblance to the one we have been exploring:
(32) A: Let’s meet at Oleana for dinner. Is that okay?
B: Where is that even? (Iatridou & Tatevosov 2016: 298)
They observe that the presence of even in (32) triggers an uncancellable inference
of extreme ignorance to the effect that Speaker B does not know the first thing
about Oleana.10 Importantly for our purposes, they suggest that what even does
in (32) can be thought of as a kind of presupposition denial. More particularly,
they argue that there is a general felicity condition on asking questions, namely that
one does not ask questions of people who are not equipped to answer them. Thus,
Speaker A’s discourse move presupposes that Speaker B is equipped with enough
9 They also discuss polar questions, where even has the additional effect of biasing the question toward
the negative answer (cf. Guerzoni 2004).
10 Oleana is a restaurant in Cambridge.
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information about Oleana to answer the Question Under Discussion (QUD). By
displaying extreme ignorance, Speaker B demonstrates that this is not the case.
Iatridou & Tatevosov (2016) derive the extreme ignorance inference that produces
this presupposition-denying effect from the scalar component of even acting on a
question. More particularly, they argue that in the cases under consideration even
takes scope over and focus-associates with the entire question, as shown in (33).11
(33) LF: even [Q + where is that]F (Iatridou & Tatevosov 2016: 305)
The resulting set of alternatives will be a set of questions that are salient in the dis-
course; in this case, questions about Oleana. When applied to this set of alternatives,
even presupposes that the prejacent question is the least likely of these alternatives,
where the relevant notion of likelihood is likelihood of being asked or askable in the
discourse context. Iatridou & Tatevosov (2016) derive extreme ignorance via what
they call the “Asking-to-Ignorance Link”, which holds that the likelihood of asking
a question is inversely proportional to the likelihood of knowing its answer; in short,
cooperative speakers do not sincerely ask for information that they already know.
Thus, by marking a question as the least likely to be asked, Speaker B also marks
it as the most likely to have its answer be known. The fact that Speaker B asked
this question shows that they do not know the answer to the question they are most
likely to know the answer to. This, Iatridou & Tatevosov (2016) claim, licenses the
inference that Speaker B does not know the answer to any of the other, more difficult
questions that are relevant in the discourse, meaning that Speaker B is in a state of
extreme ignorance.
Iatridou & Tatevosov (2016) show that this phenomenon is attested for even-like
items not just in English but also in Russian,12 Greek, and German.
(34) Russian
Eto
this
voobšcˇe
VOOBŠCˇE
gde?
where
‘Where is that even?’ (Iatridou & Tatevosov 2016: 316)
(35) Greek
Pu
where
ine
is
kan
KAN
afto?
this
‘Where is that even?’ (Iatridou & Tatevosov 2016: 316)
11 They propose that even can have a higher type than is usually assumed, taking a question as its
prejacent and a set of questions as its focus alternatives.
12 Iatridou & Tatevosov (2016) note that daže cannot appear in presupposition-challenging questions.
As we saw earlier, it can appear in declarative presupposition denials. One possible explanation for
this difference could be that daže cannot have the higher type needed to combine with questions.
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(36) German
Wo
where
ist
is
das
that
überhaupt?
ÜBERHAUPT
‘Where is that even?’ (Iatridou & Tatevosov 2016: 317)
Thus, even-like scalar items show up in presupposition-challenging discourse
moves in both declaratives and questions in multiple languages.
This result raises a new question: Is this a unified phenomenon? That is, is there
a connection between scalarity and presupposition denial? There is a clear family
resemblance between the questions discussed in this section and the declaratives
discussed in the rest of this paper; in both cases, a sentence with even is used to object
that some precondition for another speaker’s discourse move to be felicitous is not
met. However, the two accounts are very different, particularly in the role that even
plays. As we have seen, in Iatridou & Tatevosov’s (2016) account, even is responsible
for deriving the presupposition-denying effect; the scalar presupposition of even
acts at the level of discourse moves to produce extreme ignorance, and that extreme
ignorance challenges Speaker A’s presupposition that Speaker B knows enough to
answer the QUD. In the story for declaratives presented here, the presupposition-
denying effect comes from the prejacent, not from even; He isn’t married challenges
the presupposition that Kenji has a wife just as well as He isn’t even married does.
Despite their differences, there are ways of bringing the two accounts closer
together. For example, we could take Iatridou & Tatevosov’s (2016) idea of even
operating at the level of discourse moves and generalize it. That is, we could say
that what even is really doing in these presupposition denials is marking them as
unlikely or noteworthy discourse moves. In cooperative discourse, speakers should
not presuppose what is not common ground; if the conversation is unfolding as it
should, presupposition-denying discourse moves are thus very unlikely to be made.
Even could be making this fact salient, pointing out that something has gone amiss in
the conversation. However, it should be noted that on the proposal made in Section
3 the scalar presupposition of even is trivially satisfied in declarative presupposition
denials under negations because the prejacent entails the other alternatives. This
means that the scalar presupposition of even will be satisfied in any context that
makes salient the set of alternatives that we have been assuming, and so it should
not contribute any additional information about the likelihood of the discourse move
being made. I will therefore leave the question of whether the phenomenon observed
here can or should be unified with that discussed by Iatridou & Tatevosov (2016) as
a matter for future work.
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7 Conclusions
This paper has identified and explained a puzzle about how even interacts with
presupposition denial: even can be used in declarative presupposition denials only
under negation. Its core proposal is that the additive presupposition of even cannot
be satisfied when the salient alternatives contain the trigger for a presupposition that
the prejacent denies unless that presupposition is appropriately negated within the
alternatives. This means that presuppositions generated within focus alternatives
can affect the acceptability of a sentence that does not itself contain their trigger.
We have also seen evidence that even is additive even when the alternatives it
encounters are mutually exclusive. Finally, there is a rich landscape in which
to explore connections between presupposition denial and focus operators across
languages and environments.
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